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KALALA NGALAMULUME
YELLOW FEVER THREATS, THE MIASMATIC THEORY AND THE 'GEOGRAPHY OF BLAME'
In the second half of the nineteenth century Saint-Louis grew from a trading post to a commercial port city, the capital of Senegal and, for a while, the capital of French West Africa in the context of the emerging French empire. It included the city-island and three peri-urban villages of Guet Ndar, Ndar Toute and Sor. The early urban society included the Africans, a majority of whom were Wolof Muslims, and the French merchants; from their interaction emerged a metis community, which would play a key role in commerce and politics. Saint-Louis attracted an increasing floating population in search of work or assistance. It remained the largest city in francophone West Africa until 1914, with a dynamic civil society, electoral institutions and an expression of citizenship which produced 'the biggest headaches' for the colonial administration, as David Robinson has pointed out.12 However, Saint-Louis early on developed the reputation of being an unhealthy place. Indeed, urban growth and the unequal distribution of wealth and resources that accompanied it resulted in population growth and environmental contamination. International trade and travel and the inadequacies of public health policies were associated with the emergence and spread of viral, parasitic and bacterial diseases, which killed or disabled thousands of city residents.
Yellow fever is a disease of forest monkeys in Africa and the Americas. The virus is transmitted by mosquito vectors as part of a monkey-to-mosquito cycle. The disease is endemic in the jungle where it circulates between monkeys, with occasional monkey-to-human transmission through infected female Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. These mosquitoes have also adapted to living around human agglomerations and multiplied in containers of clean water, leading to urban epidemics of yellow fever. Infected mosquitoes can also travel in ships and trains and spread the disease. Yellow fever thrives where there is adequate rainfall and warm weather. A person who becomes ill presents terrifying symptoms that cause panic: jaundice, high fever, internal hemorrhage and vomiting of black blood. It has been argued that the fact that symptoms were mild in children conferred immunity to permanent residents of endemic areas or areas frequently visited by yellow fever, thus restricting the outbreaks of epidemics to the sudden arrival of large groups of newcomers such as immigrants, soldiers, sailors, etc. This view can be found in Philip Curtin's assertion that 'yellow fever in West Africa was a strangers' disease, attacking those who grew up elsewhere'."l Curtin's interpretation was a reflection of official mortality statistics that provided more details about the Europeans and the 'assimilated' group than about the majority of the natives, who had limited access to medical services. But recent scholarship in molecular biology has revealed that a person who has been exposed to a viral Yellow fever struck Saint-Louis several times in the second half of the nineteenth century and produced thousands of casualties. Understanding the career of yellow fever in the city requires an analytical framework that focuses on agency and structure, and takes a critical look at the dominant interpretational model of the colonial health officers that tends to obscure some features of the re-emergence of yellow fever. As clinician and anthropologist Paul Farmer reminds us, the emergence of a disease can neither be fully understood nor explained if one does not take into account the interaction between large-scale social forces, complex biosocial realities and local factors and actors." This approach can also shed light on other crucial issues that the outbreaks bring to the forefront of the debate such as scapegoating and stigmatization or medical profiling, associated with fear and suspicion.18 Charles L. Briggs's concept of medical profiling has a great explanatory power in that it introduces a dichotomy within the body politic between sanitary citizens, who are expected to obey the laws and cooperate with health authorities to control the epidemics, and unsanitary subjects, who are not open to modernity and are likely uncooperative patients. By choosing the path of resistance, the unsanitary subjects relieve the government from any obligation to invest in their health. 19 Yellow fever ravaged Goree in 183o and returned in 1859 and I866 without reaching Saint-Louis. But in 1867 it struck the city at the end of August and spread rapidly, provoking a general panic, and overwhelming the response capacity of the colonial authorities and the available health resources. When the disease subsided at the end of October, it had killed around 300 Europeans and hundreds of Africans.20 Before the advent of the mosquito theory, there were two overlapping theories of the disease: localism (or environmentalism) and contagionism. The localists argued that yellow fever had to do with local environmental conditions, both natural and human-made. Epidemics were understood to be caused by noxious miasmas emitted by decaying organic matters arising from the cemeteries, stagnant pools from floods and torrential rains that had transformed the streets of Saint-Louis into infected ponds, and the natural environment surrounding the city -a flat swampy land, the mouth of the Senegal River and the mixture of salty and non-salty water in the river around the city. The frequent and terrible 'winds from the south' during the summer months contributed to the spread of diseases. Other sources of miasmas included waste from animal slaughtering, and urine and manure from camels, mules, sheep, cows and horses left rotting in the streets and public spaces, and along the docks. Localists did not see yellow fever as a disease that could be transmitted from person to person; one could simply inhale miasmas or be exposed to the sunlight and get sick.
The contagionists contended that yellow fever was caused by a kind of poison which could be transmitted through contacts between people or through infected buildings and objects such as clothes, merchandise, mail, skins, leather, wool and feathers, irrespective of the local sanitary conditions. Contagionists believed that yellow fever was not locally produced; instead, it was imported to the city from Sierra Leone, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea or Grand-Bassam via Goree and Dakar.21
Besides these general causes of fevers, both localists and contagionists had identified other predisposing factors that they believed played a key role in determining the pattern of infection, especially who would get infected and die, who would recover and who would not get sick. These factors included unsanitary housing, tropical heat, poor diet, fatigue, bad habits and excesses and 'moral emotions' caused by frequent disputes resulting from crosscultural miscommunication in situations of 'forced interaction' with the indigines -such as aboard ships -in which 'Europeans are obliged to refrain themselves' from taking any action that would worsen the increasingly strained race relations.22
Techniques used to deal with the yellow fever threat combined both sanitationist and quarantinist approaches. The localists favored strategies aimed at attacking the predisposing factors and improving sanitation and hygiene enforced by municipal police, while the contagionists relied mainly on quarantines, sanitary cordons, disinfection and isolation. The two schools of thought were not incompatible, however, and did not form two permanent groups. There were probably few committed localists and contagionists; rather, the majority of public health officials found both explanations 
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KALALA NGALAMULUME the preparedness for epidemics, the public health officials recommended measures that emphasized sanitation and hygiene, disinfection, the isolation of European troops and an effective use of hospital services, as well as a surveillance program that would enforce the quarantine regulations applying to ships arriving from contaminated or suspected regions.24 Such measures had serious disruptive effects and an intrusiveness that the authorities underestimated, as I will discuss below. They were certainly convinced that the outbreak response was effective, however. But yellow fever subsided simply because of the extended cold weather from January through May, which sent mosquitoes into hibernation, and the short life-span (less than two months) of the female A. aegypti. Efforts to control a disease about which little was known and to avoid its recurrence heightened the anxieties that the French felt about Senegal. While the yellow fever policy was implemented, a cholera epidemic ravaged Saint-Louis in November 1868 and within a month it had killed i,112 indigenes -5,000 according to missionary sources25 -and 92 Europeans,26 including Governor Pinet-Laprade, out of a population of 20,000. The succession of outbreaks challenged the basic assumptions about the interaction between the French and the indigenes and provided the authorities with a rationale for accelerating the change in urban policy from cohabitation to racial and class segregation that had started a decade earlier. Health authorities first targeted Saint-Louis's marketplace, which they perceived as a source of miasmas generated by foodstuffs that were exposed to the burning sun. In addition, the marketplace was described as the site of 'forced agglomeration of individuals, almost naked, the majority of whom have no notion of decency, who presented to the European population from the metropole a revolting as well as immoral spectacle'.27 The marketplace was transferred to Ndar Toute. The authorities next targeted unsanitary housing, especially the shacks located in the city center that were seen as breeding grounds for the disease, and decided to eliminate the indigenes from the city center. Known as the bataille de la paillotte (war on shacks or thatch-roofed houses) during Faidherbe's tenure in the I85os and I86os, the policy of forced removals continued between I871 and 1873 to include the streets of Saint-Paul in the north and Saint-Joseph in the south.28 The authorities presented the policy as based not on race but on class, social status and culture, especially the living standards and the degree of westernization or modernity, which explains why it did not affect the metis and Muslim merchant families. The policy was justified by the inability of the indigenes to meet the requirements of the building codes in order to prevent frequent fires during the cold season.
The evidence suggests that the policy of forced removals was actually inspired by racial prejudice, however. Studies on race and ethnic relations have shown that it is possible to 'fence in' a set of beliefs by periodically admitting to exceptions, and to look down upon the majority of others in the same category, who, presumably, are really 'typical'.29 The specific historical situation of Saint-Louis, with the structural features of its commerce and its complex political and civil society, can help explain why the metis and Muslim merchant families were defined as exceptions and categorized as sanitary citizens. Yellow fever and cholera outbreaks and the imagined or real class character that they took led the health authorities to construct the indigines as natural targets for particular diseases and as threats to the health of the Europeans and people associated with them. In French thinking, the indigenes had disqualified themselves from sanitary citizenship by refusing to adopt French cultural values and ideas of progress, and were therefore situated outside modernity and 'civilization'. They were 'different', 'other', and the social difference was located in their customs, habits, lifestyles and sexuality. Their women were seen littering and bathing naked in public, and these practices were viewed as the result of 'self-negligence' and 'the absence of sentiments that distinguish people who respect themselves', despite the claim Many of the merchants' complaints were justified. Ships were inspected and quarantined for five to twenty-three days depending on the presence or absence of morbidity or mortality at the port of departure or aboard the ships, and on the nature of the commodities. Merchandise was unloaded and disinfected at the lazaret, often resulting in long delays that were due either to the incompetence and the unwillingness of the sanitary workers to fulfill the required tasks or to inadequate infrastructure. Merchants and ship captains wanted to avoid medical inspections and quarantines at all costs. Some ship captains were unloading their passengers before entering the ports."s There were reports that British doctors in Sierra Leone and Gambia were issuing fraudulent bills of health that had no mention of yellow fever, thus giving an unfair advantage to British merchants vis-ai-vis their French competitors. Very often, yellow fever was disguised by describing other, less frightening diseases."51 The reference to the 'ordinary African fever ... confined to natives' can be understood in this context. It was presented as a fever that was natural to Africans and did not require any special medical attention, thus corroborating the idea that as long as a disease affected the natives, it did not require intervention. In any case, British merchants' misrepresentation of the sanitary situation, inspired by greed or profit motives, underlined the problems that the colonial powers had to resolve in their effort to establish a regional surveillance system of outbreaks. Besides these managerial problems, merchants raised serious doubts about the scientific knowledge on which all these 'radical measures' and 'irrational practices' were based, at the time when newspapers featured commercials about new disinfection machines 'capable of destroying the microbes of yellow fever in a few minutes at a temperature of more than i oo degrees'.
52 Navy officers too contended that the quarantine was detrimental to the conduct of war in Soudan because it affected the supplies to the troops. circulated that the authorities were making plans for a rapid repatriation of civil servants and troops. The onset of a dangerous situation gave rise to panic. Merchants mobilized for flight. As new cases were reported, the authorities finally used the tools at their disposal, especially quarantine, repatriation of non-essential personnel and the liming of suspected houses to protect the city and its 30,000 residents, including 1,5oo Europeans, from the epidemic. Between July and September, when the last cases were reported, 228 residents, including 49 Europeans, had succumbed to yellow fever; hundreds of Europeans were repatriated, including Governor-General E. Chaudie, and some prominent civil servants. Many metis and other African residents had also deserted the city.61 L'Echo de Paris reported that 'a complete anarchy exists in Senegal since the hasty departure of M. Chaudie and the shameful flight of some civil servants following the example of their chief; it is unacceptable that the telegraph no longer functions'.62 Dr. Noel Ballay, governor of Guinea, went to Dakar to replace Chaudie. 63 The quarantine was lifted in early January 1901. The 900oo outbreak proved that the city was better prepared to handle a new epidemic crisis, as evidenced by low mortality rates compared to previous years.
In their zeal to protect the city against the new outbreak, the authorities targeted the unsanitary subjects they suspected of spreading the disease. Thirty-five suspected Syrian peddlers operating between Saint-Louis and other coastal cities were blamed for buying and selling contaminated clothes previously used by people who became victims of yellow fever. They were ordered to submit to medical examination and issued identity cards in order to control their movement.64 Four single women working for the Sarrazin family on Parquet Street as domestic servants, and who had friendly relations with the crew members of the ship Saint Kilda, were blamed for the spread of yellow fever. A local publisher and notable, Cornu, affirmed that the crew of Saint Kilda brought the 'germ' of yellow fever and passed it along to the women, who in turn contaminated the troops. Another source of infection, he believed, was a small house located at the end of the same street where other negresses de mauvaise vie (prostitutes) lived and were visited by French troops. He felt that it was his duty to report these 'facts' to the authorities.65 The police chief, J. Avrial, confirmed these allegations and recommended that Mrs. Sarrazin's house be disinfected. 66 The authorities considered single women dangerous: they were saturated with sexuality and, thus, a threat to city's health. 67 Throughout the epidemic crisis, opposition to anti-yellow fever measures increased. The office of the governor-general was flooded with complaints from all over Senegal and French West Africa about the negative impact of the quarantine and cordons sanitaires on food supplies and prices of commodities. The 'Europeans and inhabitants of Tivaouane' protested against the suspension of the delivery of ice made in Saint-Louis described as 'a precious resource for the society' and 'the most precious auxiliary for the doctor during the rainy and hot season'."6 By August eight Muslim merchants from the same town requested permission to get kola nuts, their 'only resource', shipped from Rufisque. They expressed the fear that the interruption of commerce and the lack of money for food and other basic necessities would destroy their lives.69 Protests continued throughout the summer months. Traders from the hinterland of Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis, who were directly affected by the quarantine measures, voiced their opposition to measures they found 'radical'. In a strongly worded letter to the governor-general dated 7 September 19oo, M. Meyer, the representative of the Societe le Syndicat du Soudan Franfais, opposed the rigorous quarantine, which resulted in a great loss for the traders. He wrote that he could not find one example in Europe or elsewhere in other colonies where commerce was completely stopped because of the epidemic. He emphasized that because the quarantine intervened between August and September, at exactly the same time when the Senegal River was navigable until Kayes, the flow of goods along the river was reduced dramatically.7"
The local Saint-Louis elite also opposed the quarantine. During the meeting of the Colonial Commission of 28 July I900, Justin Deves shifted emphasis from economic, administrative and psychological reasons to medical reasons for the suppression of the quarantine. He contended that physicians were helpless against a disease 'that escaped modern science and empirical processes', and that yellow fever affected only a small percentage of the urban residents (Europeans), but it interrupted the economic and social life of all. Instead of quarantine, Devils argued, the best solution would be to provide Europeans with medical leave and/or home care during the summer rains. This proposal suggested that the metis and other Africans perceived yellow fever as the 'white man's disease' that did not affect them, thus reflecting the official thinking concerning racial susceptibility. Indeed, the general consensus among health officials was that yellow fever provided immunity to Africans who were infected in childhood; as a result, adults who were reinfected developed only attenuated or mild symptoms that went unnoticed though they remained 'active carriers of the epidemics'. It was believed that Europeans, in contrast, did not have that acquired immunity; the most vulnerable among them were not those who had survived yellow fever and were 'seasoned', but the newcomers and those who were experiencing their second or third hivernage. This inequality before death was summarized in a popular saying which stated that 'the bourgeoning of the baobab leaves (hivernage) announced the imminent death of the Europeans, 68 
